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Abstract
The nation state is discovering the limits of its crisis management capacities. The Ebola and Zika 
outbreaks, the financial crisis, the downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine, sinking ships overfilled 
with refugees, cyber-attacks, urban terrorism and existential environmental threats serve as strong 
reminders of the complex origins and transboundary dimensions of many contemporary crises 
and disasters. As these transboundary aspects of modern crises become increasingly manifest, the 
need for international, collaborative responses appears ever clearer. But that collaboration does 
not always emerge in time (or at all). Even in the European Union, which has various transboundary 
crisis management mechanisms in place, the willingness to initiate joint crisis responses varies. 
This observation prompted our research question: Why do states collaborate in response to some 
transboundary crises but not others? We bring together the crisis and collective action literatures 
to formulate a theoretical framework that can help answer this question. This article identifies cru-
cial factors that facilitate a possible pathway toward a joint response.
Introduction: Collaboration in the Face of 
Transboundary Crises1
Whether we consider the Eurozone crisis, the latest Ebola 
outbreak or the most recent refugee tragedy, it is clear 
that many of today’s crises traverse national borders and 
policy domains (Ansell, Boin, and Keller et al. 2010; Beck 
2008; Lagadec 2009; OECD 2003). As the causes and 
consequences of such transboundary crises increasingly 
stretch across borders, it becomes harder and harder for 
nation states to go it alone. The effective management of 
transboundary crises typically requires international col-
laboration among states and between different policy sec-
tors (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010; Sandler 1997). Yet, 
such collaboration is not always forthcoming.2
The European Union (EU) is a case in point. In re-
cent years, the EU has created an expanding set of 
mechanisms and arrangements to help member states 
coordinate their efforts in response to a wide variety of 
crises (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013; Widmalm, 
Parker, and Persson 2019). The EU’s joint response to 
Haiti’s 2010 earthquake disaster is just one example of 
what have become almost routine EU missions to sup-
port destabilized countries outside the EU (Norheim-
Martinsen 2013; Tercovich 2014). Member states also 
collaborated—perhaps somewhat belatedly—in re-
sponse to highly complex and politically fraught crises 
such as the 2008 financial crisis, the 2010 ash crisis 
and various animal disease outbreaks (Parsons and 
Matthijs 2015; Schimmelfennig 2014).
Collaboration has been significantly less forthcoming 
in other crises, however. A particularly glaring example 
is the migration crisis that hit multiple European coun-
tries in the fall of 2015. National decisions on border 
and refugee transport policies were made in a unilat-





















1 We thank the reviewers for multiple rounds of critical comments that 
helped us to strengthen this article.
2 We employ the terms “collaboration” and “cooperation” interchangeably 
throughout this article to refer to actors undertaking joint crisis 
management. We recognize that “collaboration” is a loaded term in 
the international relations literature due to the distinction between 
coordination and collaboration games (Martin 1992; Stein 1982).
Perspectives on Public Management and Governance, 2020, 197–209
doi:10.1093/ppmgov/gvz031
Article







g/article/3/3/197/5712132 by Jacob H
eeren user on 02 June 2021
Perspectives on Public Management and Governance, 2020, Vol. 3, No. 3198
fend for themselves. Germany opened its borders to 
refugees at approximately the same time that Hungary 
started building fences along its borders with Serbia 
and Croatia. And while the member states did agree—
by qualified majority vote—to the redistribution of 
a limited number of refugees, that agreement was 
plagued by implementation problems.
These contrasting observations give rise to our re-
search question: Why do states collaborate in response 
to some transboundary crises but not others? In this 
article, we formulate a theoretical approach that will 
help answer this question.
We start with an exploration of the collective action lit-
erature. Collective action scholars study situations where 
actors must collaborate to achieve a shared goal (Sandler 
2004, 17). This literature helps to explain why states are 
hesitant to collaborate, but also identifies factors that may 
enable such collaboration.3 In this article, we investigate if 
and to what extent these insights are applicable to under-
standing why states do or don’t collaborate in the face of 
transboundary crises (cf. Rhinard, Hollis, and Boin 2013). 
We assess these insights against findings of crisis manage-
ment studies (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010; Backman 
and Rhinard 2018; Boin, Rhinard, and Ekengren 2014; 
Laegreid and Rykkja 2018). By bringing together these 
separate fields of study, we can formulate a set of hypoth-
eses and identify critical factors that are thought to enable 
a pathway toward joint crisis management.
Why Do States Work Together in Times of 
Crisis? Insights from Collective Action and 
Crisis Management Theory
In this article, we draw from two bodies of theory: col-
lective action theory and crisis management theory. The 
collective action literature has generated a trove of in-
sights with regard to the general willingness of states to 
collaborate and the chances of success of such collab-
oration. But collective action scholars have not put a 
major focus on the specific challenges of collaboration 
that emerge in response to crises. That is why we turn 
to the budding field of crisis management theory, which 
helps us understand the peculiarities of crisis situations 
and allows us to assess and, where necessary, modify 
the key findings of the collective action literature. In this 
section, we briefly introduce both fields of study.
The Logic of Collective Action
Our exploration of collective action theory begins with 
Olson’s (1965) classic work, The Logic of Collective 
Action. The core assertion in Olson’s book is that ra-
tional egoism (i.e., rational decision making based on 
self-interest) ultimately undermines the prospect of 
collaboration that is needed to provide a public good.4 
As Sandler (1992, 3) concisely puts it, “[Olson’s] book 
rests on a single basic premise: individual rationality is 
not sufficient for collective rationality.” This premise 
gives rise to what is known as the collective action 
problem: why would a rational person contribute ef-
forts or resources to the provision of a good when 
everybody can consume it just as easily and in the same 
quantity as those who actually helped produce it?
Olson contended that this “free rider” logic applied just 
as strongly to relations between states as it did to the be-
havior of individuals within a group (Olson 1965; Olson 
and Zeckhauser 1966). In fact, collective action is regarded 
as uniquely challenging at the international level because 
there is no equivalent of the nation state with authority 
to compel the provision of public goods (see Nordhaus 
2006 on the “Westphalian Dilemma”). Climate change 
mitigation may be the most obvious example: why would 
a state engage in politically fraught and expensive reforms 
if other states are solving the problem?
Myriad works have built upon this original state-
ment of the collective action problem. In this article, 
we draw from four sets of literature that have applied 
Olson’s insights to the question of international cooper-
ation: International Relations, regional and EU integra-
tion, global public goods provision, and common-pool 
resource management.5 These literatures highlight two 
3 There are other approaches to studying collaboration between actors 
(see f.i. Ansell and Gash 2008). We concentrate on the collective action 
literature writ large as it is most applicable to the question at hand (why 
do states collaborate or not in the face of crisis?). To be sure, our aim 
is not to criticize or further develop the collective action literature. We 
simply seek to mine this literature and enrich the most important insights 
with insights from the literature on transboundary crisis management.
4 Pure public goods are nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption 
(Samuelson 1954). Nonexcludable means that it is practically impossible 
or prohibitively costly to exclude anyone from consuming the good; and 
nonrival means that one actor’s consumption of the good does not detract 
from that of others. A classic example is the lighthouse—once its lamp has 
been turned on, anyone within a reasonable distance can make use of the 
light, and one person’s use of it in no way detracts from another’s. Common 
pool resources, as discussed by Ostrom (1990), are another type of collective 
good. They are nonexcludable but rival: again, it is practically impossible or 
prohibitively costly to exclude actors from using them; however, one actor’s 
usage of such a good does diminish the ability of others to use it. The classic 
example is a livestock grazing pasture shared by a group of farmers.
5 The international relations and regional integration literatures are relatively 
well known. The global public goods literature can be traced back several 
decades (Camps 1980; Evans 1970; Kindleberger 1981, 1986; Scott 1974), 
but it gained traction around the turn of the millennium (Barrett 2006, 2007; 
Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999; Morrison 1993; Nordhaus 2006; Sandler 
1997, 1998, 2004; Stiglitz 1995). For a recent review of this literature, see 
Kaul, Blondin, and Nahtigal (2016). The commons-management literature 
also dates back several decades (Butler 1977; Hardin 1968; Nordhaus 
1982; Wijkman 1982), but the work that has come to define it is Ostrom’s 
(1990) book on commons governance. While Ostrom’s original case studies 
were of collective action at the community or regional level, she explicitly 
pondered the transferability of her findings to the international level 
(Keohane and Ostrom 1994) and went on to apply a model of “polycentric 
governance” to the management of international-level commons 
problems, particularly climate change (Ostrom 2010, 2014). For noteworthy 
summaries of, and recent updates to the commons-management literature, 
see Agrawal (2002), Cox, Arnold, and Villamayor Tomás (2010), Singleton 
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fundamental obstacles to international collaboration: 
(1) the lack of common ground or joint preferences for 
national governments to agree on joint action, and (2) 
the enforcement and coordination problems that tend 
to plague international cooperation even when na-
tional preferences align. The key finding that emerges 
from this literature holds that collaboration is unlikely 
to happen unless it is strongly encouraged or strictly 
enforced.
A critical question is whether and to what extent 
the insights of the collective action literature apply to 
understanding the willingness of states to engage in 
transboundary crisis management. The collective ac-
tion literature does not make a sharp distinction be-
tween long-term global challenges and the acute crises 
that are at the heart of this article (cf. Kaul, Blondin, 
and Nahtigal 2016).6 It focuses on the creation of 
public goods such as treaties or international organ-
izations. Some of the suggestions for facilitating col-
lective action are thus tightly tied to problems or issues 
that are fundamentally different from cooperation in a 
crisis situation.7 The mechanisms put forward as facili-
tators of joint action typically require significant time 
to work (which, by definition, is in short supply during 
an acute crisis).
Collective action theory excels in identifying fac-
tors that curtail collaboration in the delivery of inter-
national public goods. But because the associated 
literatures have not systematically studied acute crisis 
responses, we bring in the insights of crisis research to 
assess those factors and identify others.
Challenges of Transboundary Crisis Management
In most definitions, a crisis situation is marked by a 
sense of threat, the need for an urgent response and 
conditions of deep uncertainty (Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and 
Charles 1989). Policy elites perceive an urgent need for 
action, but it is not clear what can or should be done. 
This widely shared sense of urgency sets crises apart 
from the complex policy challenges that take central 
stage in the collective action literature.8
Crisis scholars distinguish between crisis types 
(Gundel 2005; Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and Charles 1989). 
One often-made key distinction is between “known” 
and “unknown” crises (routine incidents v.  Black 
Swans). The implication is that it is easier to manage 
crises that happen more often than it is to manage 
crises that have yet to be imagined. Another traditional 
distinction focuses on the causes of crisis (Erikson 
1994). Natural disasters are thought to induce soli-
darity whereas human-made crises give rise to societal 
divisions. Cooperation is considered more likely in the 
former than in the latter.
We define a transboundary crisis here as a crisis that 
crosses geographical and/or policy boundaries (Ansell, 
Boin, and Keller 2010). A transboundary crisis requires 
transboundary crisis management capacities. This 
means that the various types of required capacities—
think of analytical, regulative, and delivery capacities 
(cf. Lodge and Wegrich 2014)—must be organized at 
the transboundary level. That can be the international 
level (countries working together) or at the inter-
sectoral level (policy sectors working together). In this 
article, we are focusing on the former. A joint response 
requires a multistate agreement on the need for a joint 
response, as well as adherence to that agreement.
As we have seen, the collective action literature is 
not optimistic about the chances of international col-
laboration emerging in the face of complex problems. 
We can assume that a joint response is even more un-
likely in the case of a crisis, if only for the reason that 
there is less time to produce such a response. The crisis 
management literature confirms this intuition: it has 
identified many pitfalls that governments encounter 
in trying to organize a rapid, effective, and legitimate 
response to emerging contingencies (Boin et al. 2016; 
Nohrstedt et al. 2018; Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and Charles 
1989; Turner 1978). Crisis management scholars are 
therefore skeptical that crises can be “solved” or even 
managed; they are really talking about coping efforts.9
The challenges involved in managing a crisis deepen 
when a crisis takes on transboundary dimensions 
(Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010; Laegreid and Rykkja 
2018). The reason is that information has to be shared 
across organizational and political borders, decisions 
have to be made in the absence of clearly defined 
mandates and communications must be aligned (Boin 
2019). Without collaboration between all actors in-
volved, an effective response seems illusive.
In discussing both literatures, we should note that 
there are two paradigms at work. Collective action re-
search by and large relies on a rational actor approach. 
6 The collection action literature does talk about crises (for instance, 
the climate crisis), but most often does not use the term to denote 
a threatening situation where a response has to be produced in a 
relatively brief time window.
7 For instance, there is a heavy focus on how to obtain and most 
efficiently distribute financing in these works (which does seem to be 
a genuine problem for “creeping crisis” type issues that fall lower on 
the policy agenda), but financing does not seem to be as big of an issue 
when it comes to acute crisis responses.
8 We note that crises can have long incubation phases. The tipping point 
that demarcates a “creeping crisis” from an urgent crisis is the moment 
that policy elites converge on the assessment that the situation is dire 
and remedial action is needed immediately.
9 We limit ourselves to explaining the emergence of actual collaboration 
between states. We study collaboration as an output rather than a 
process. We do not seek to explain the effectiveness (or outcome) of 
the collaboration in minimizing the impact of a crisis. The emergence of 
a joint response does not necessarily mean that the crisis is effectively 
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Authors typically treat state interests as exogenously 
given. Crisis management research complicates this 
picture, as it typically problematizes the formation of 
actor preferences. Crises are viewed as social construc-
tions; crisis definitions are viewed as the outcomes of 
political fights over the proper labeling or framing of 
emergent issues (‘t Hart 1993). This political perspec-
tive on crisis management assumes that states will see 
protracted battles over problem definitions, which may 
further inhibit transboundary collaboration.10
Both literatures thus agree that a joint crisis response 
is unlikely at best. The collective action literature sees 
limited prospects for rational alignment between states’ 
preferences. The crisis literature cautions against the 
idea that the occurrence of a transboundary crisis will 
override national concerns and automatically lead to 
collaboration. The literature is at pains to demonstrate 
that long-standing social and political divisions do not 
simply dissolve at the political level in the face of an 
emerging crisis (Boin et al. 2016). At the same time, the 
crisis literature brings to the fore a set of cases in which 
collaboration did happen (thus allowing us to identify 
enabling factors).
First, we turn to the question of common ground: 
what are the conditions under which states are more 
or less likely to agree on the necessity and nature of a 
joint crisis response? Second, we ask which factors fa-
cilitate the implementation of a joint crisis response.11 
Both sections will translate the findings into testable 
hypotheses.
Agreeing on the Necessity of a Joint Crisis 
Response
In collective action studies that aim to explain why na-
tions collaborate, national preferences play a prominent 
role. The common wisdom holds that skewed or hetero-
geneous preferences inhibit cooperation between states 
(Keohane and Ostrom 1994, 411). As Scharpf (2006, 
851)  concludes, “the difficulty of reaching negotiated 
agreement increases with the heterogeneity of [national] 
conditions, interests and preferences.”12 In other words, 
there is broad agreement that preference homogeneity 
facilitates international collaboration (Keohane and 
Ostrom 1994, 410; Nováky 2015). The question is 
whether this holds true for crisis collaboration.
We should consider preference formation at two levels 
(Fearon 1998; Krasner 1991; Morrow 1994). First, 
the question is whether actors within a state can agree 
on the nature of the problem and the preferred solu-
tion. Second, the question is whether a set of states can 
find sufficient common ground for crisis cooperation. 
Perusing the collective action and crisis management lit-
eratures, we found four factors that are widely thought 
to affect group-level homogeneity. In this section, we 
discuss these factors and formulate hypotheses.
Politicization at Home
Crises are socially constructed events that lend them-
selves to political exploitation (Boin et al. 2009). Crises 
can rally all parties around the proverbial flag, but they 
can also provoke political discord.13 The literature sug-
gests that when a crisis triggers intense political debate, 
it becomes more difficult for national leaders to agree 
on international collaboration (Elgström and Jönsson 
2000, 691–2; cf. ‘t Hart 1993).14 The politicization of 
crisis “raise[s] the heat of debate, narrow[s] the sub-
stantive ground of possible [international] agreement 
and make[s] key actors, including particularly national 
governments, less willing to compromise” (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009, 22).15
10 We also recognize that some scholars have adopted an institutional 
approach to crisis management (Christensen, Laegreid, and Rykkja 
2016). The findings of these studies tend to further complicate the 
picture, as additional failure factors are identified. The point that 
we seek to make remains the same: crisis management is a difficult 
challenge; transboundary crises are even harder to manage.
11 Chronologically speaking, discussion of these two problems is reversed 
in the literature. Olson’s original take on collective action emphasized 
what is alternately labeled the free-riding, defection, or enforcement 
(monitoring and sanctioning) problem. He assumed that all actors in a 
group wanted a public good to be produced and then asked why they 
would nonetheless avoid contributing to its production. Much of the 
research into international cooperation in the aftermath of Olson’s work 
focused on this “free-riding” problem, or the closely linked issue of how 
to coordinate actor behavior in large groups. The underlying puzzle was 
why efforts at international cooperation nevertheless often failed (or 
surprisingly succeeded). Subsequently, researchers have more fully 
explored national preference formation and international bargaining. 
One key finding—beyond the conclusion that preference homogeneity 
facilitates cooperation—is the existence of cooperation-confounding 
multiple equilibria, that is, multiple options for cooperation on a given 
issue, each with its own distributional implications (Fearon 1998).
12 Olson (1965) argued that preference heterogeneity might facilitate the 
provision of public goods (see also Keohane and Ostrom 1994, 409–11; 
Russett and Sullivan 1971, 853). More formally, Olson argued that 
“privileged groups,” that is, groups in which at least one member has 
a preference schedule that incentivizes it to unilaterally provide the 
collective good in question, are those in which collective good provision 
is most likely to occur (Hardin 1982, 43; Sandler 1992, 8–12). Taking a closer 
look at the work of Olson, we can see that the apparent contradiction 
can be easily resolved. The “heterogeneity-helps” reasoning assumes 
there is sufficient common ground among actors for collective action to 
be the rational outcome of negotiations. “Preference heterogeneity” in 
many discussions of collective action refers to disparities in preference 
intensity rather than fundamental misalignment of preferences.
13 Man-made disasters appear to be much more prone to societal 
polarization and politicization than natural disasters (Erikson 1994).
14 Politicization broadly refers to the increased public salience, or 
visibility, of an issue (i.e., more actors paying attention to that issue) 
and an increased polarization of opinion surrounding that issue 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016).
15 This causal mechanism is broadly in line with Putnam’s (1988) two-
level game logic: politicization reduces the Level II (domestic) win sets, 
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Transboundary crisis collaboration can easily be-
come politicized (Hobolt and Wratil 2015; Hooghe 
and Marks 2009, 13, 21–2).16 It has been observed, 
for instance, that some EU member states did not 
want to request disaster assistance from other member 
states (through the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism) 
because it would suggest that the disaster-hit state 
could not handle its own affairs (Boin, Ekengren, and 
Rhinard 2013). In the United States, the request for 
federal assistance after a disaster has been the object 
of intense politicization (Gasper 2015; Reeves 2011). 
It is simply not a given that a state in need of outside 
help will seek it.
Building on these insights, we hypothesize that
H1:  The more countries in which the idea of 
transboundary crisis collaboration is politi-
cized, the less likely these countries are to 
seek collaboration to deal with a common 
threat.
Crisis Exposure and Expected Benefits
Ostrom’s work suggests that a community whose 
members will be similarly harmed through inaction 
and expect to benefit similarly from joint action is 
more likely to work collectively. For Ostrom, then, col-
lective action is triggered by a perceptible and common 
threat to the resource upon which group members 
jointly depend (Ostrom 1990, 90–2, 211). A mutually 
vulnerable community of actors becomes a key explan-
ation for explaining cooperation (Singleton and Taylor 
1992; cf. Wade 1988).
Threat exposure is not a binary concept. Even 
if all members of a group of states are exposed to a 
transboundary crisis, they may well be exposed in dif-
ferent ways. In line with international relations works 
on the “multiple equilibria” problem (Fearon 1998; 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001), the theoretical 
expectation is that asymmetric exposure is problematic 
for cooperation because it will lead national govern-
ments to prefer different crisis response strategies with 
different distributional consequences and, thereby, 
to conflictual, cooperation-threatening intergovern-
mental bargaining.
The practical upshot is that if states do not share 
a similar perception of threat and consequences, 
they will also expect to benefit unevenly from a joint 
response to that threat. The un- or under-exposed 
states will receive far less benefit from a joint crisis 
response than the heavily exposed states (at least 
in the short run). According to the collective action 
literature, we should expect the former to be less 
enthused about bearing the costs of joint action, 
as this would essentially require “uncompensated 
sacrifices” from those states (Scharpf 2006, 851). 
Asymmetric exposure thus creates problematic pref-
erence heterogeneity on the basic desirability of a 
joint crisis response.
One example of asymmetric exposure can be 
found in the various ways EU member states were ex-
posed to the migration crisis in 2015–16. Some—for 
example, Croatia and Slovenia—were “transit coun-
tries” (while hundreds of thousands of people passed 
through them, only a few requested asylum). Other 
member states—for example, Austria, Germany, and 
Sweden—were “destination countries” to which hun-
dreds of thousands if not millions of people applied 
for asylum. Yet other countries—think of Italy and 
Greece—were the first points of entry to the EU. In 
such cases, collective action theorists would expect 
national leaders on different sides of the exposure 
asymmetries to arrive at divergent preferences on the 
necessity of a joint crisis response. In turn, this type 
of preference heterogeneity will complicate efforts to 
agree on a specific response strategy.
This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H2:  The more even and symmetric the perceived 
exposure of states to a transboundary threat, 
the higher the willingness to initiate joint 
collaboration to deal with that threat.
Can States Decouple?
If a state can simply disassociate or de-couple itself 
from a crisis (for instance, by building a wall) and 
thus limit its exposure (to immigrants), collective ac-
tion theorists assume that the will to cooperate di-
minishes.17 Conversely, if the costs of de-coupling 
are high, or if it is practically infeasible, cooperation 
may be perceived as necessary. The question, then, 
is whether and how easily states can decouple, that 
is, whether they can unilaterally build a fence (meta-
phorically or literally) and seal themselves off from 
the crisis.
It is probably easier to decouple from some crises 
than it is from others: whereas people may be stopped 
at the border, it is impossible to shield a country from 
volcanic ash. But the ease of decoupling is also shaped 
by previous decisions and sunk costs (Schmitter 1969, 
16 The impact of politicization on international collaboration can vary 
by issue area (Elgström and Jönsson 2000, 691–2; Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs 2016; Hobolt and Wratil 2015).
17 Decoupling is a term used in the crisis management literature to 
signify the disconnection of a unit or organization in the midst of a 
crisis (Perrow 1999). Hardin (1982, 72–4) raised this “exit” question in 
his review of the collective action literature. Hardin’s point was that 
if individual group members have easy access to an alternative good, 
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162–4). A  higher level of integration between states 
raises the costs of noncollaboration for a country. In 
EU studies, a history of cooperation is thought to raise 
“the political costs of failure to agree, since a failure 
to agree can now have adverse implications for the re-
gime” (Fearon 1998, 298).
There are several reasons why this is the case. 
First, states may hesitate to decouple because doing 
so would entail heavy losses (Parsons and Matthijs 
2015; Schmitter 1970). Second, and closely re-
lated, the perceived fragility of an interdependent 
regime may matter. If the defection of one state—
or a limited number of states—would undermine 
a regime, we can expect the leaders of that state 
to think twice about decoupling and for them to 
come under intense external pressure to cooperate. 
Third, the existence of rules against exiting an inter-
national regime may severely complicate efforts 
at decoupling.
The Eurozone serves as a good example of the high 
costs that may come with defection from cooperation. 
The Euro remains a symbolic integration project and 
the sunk costs of adopting the common currency are 
high. Deep interdependencies have been created by 
the monetary union, such that the whole regime is 
threatened by the potential departure of a member 
state. The rule-based barriers to exit are significant: 
there is no formal procedure for Eurozone exit, save 
exiting the EU entirely (Schimmelfennig 2018). In 
comparison, sunk costs and interdependencies were 
relatively low in the EU’s refugee and asylum regime 
prior to the migration crisis: not many observers 
would have identified the Dublin Regulations as one 
of the EU’s symbolic integration projects and the legal 
barriers to exit (via border closure) were relatively 
weak (temporary border closures are permitted under 
the Schengen Area rules).
Based on these insights, we hypothesize that
H3:  The likelihood of a collaborative crisis re-
sponse increases when states face a threat 
from which it is practically difficult if not 
impossible to decouple.
Repeated Interaction
A core finding in the collective action and inter-
national cooperation literature pertains to the impact 
of repeated interaction. In repetitive, or “iterative” 
settings, actors are not faced with a one-off choice 
of whether to work collectively or not. They know 
that they will interact with the same partner(s) many 
times. Repeated interaction settings dramatically in-
crease the prospects for cooperation (Axelrod 1984; 
Keohane 1986; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; 
Nye 1987; Oye 1985; Sandler 1992, 2004; Taylor 
1976).18 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001, 764–
5) summarize the conventional wisdom in concluding 
that “the density of contemporary international inter-
dependence creates repeated interaction that makes 
cooperation feasible.”
Translating this logic to the crisis context, we might 
expect that where states engage in particularly dense 
interactions across a host of policy sectors and look 
set to do so well into the future (e.g., the European 
Union), they will be more likely to collectively manage 
crises. Repeated interaction can foster collective action 
in two ways.
First, institutional structures are likely to arise when 
countries collaborate over time to deal with known 
risks. The collection action literature has pointed to 
policy communities or “clubs” in such areas as avi-
ation and animal disease control. This literature has 
also described how in the climate change arena states 
have built clubs to provide for public goods (Hovi et al. 
2019; Nordhaus 2015; Sandler 2013). These “clubs of 
the willing” provide a clear structure that states can 
use in times of sudden crisis.
Second, repeated interaction can lead to the de-
velopment of norms and social conventions that fa-
cilitate cooperation. The reasoning is that repeated 
interaction prompts the development of networked 
relationships, shared norms and trust (Putnam 1993). 
Ostrom and colleagues have explained how trust (in 
the context of trusting others to reciprocate) can de-
velop over time and enable collective action (Poteete, 
Janssen, and Ostrom 2010, 226–7; see also Baland 
and Platteau 1996; Wade 1988). Interactions over 
a prolonged period might even lead to the develop-
ment of a common identity among actors that would 
radically shift their preferences and thereby expedite 
cooperation (Ekengren 2018). This notion is visible 
in Beck’s (2008) discussion of the cosmopolitan state 
(see also Russet and Sullivan 1971, 851–2; Wendt 
1994).
There is empirical research to back this up: repeated 
interaction between professional bureaucrats in the EU 
18 It does this by creating a “shadow of the future” that influences 
decision making in the present. This shadow emerges because actors 
know that they will be working with each other not once but many 
times and they value the outcomes of both the first and the subsequent 
interactions. There is a tit-for-tat effect at play here: if an actor defects 
from cooperation in Round 1, they can expect their counterparts to 
do so in Round 2.  In other words, non-cooperative behavior can be 
punished over time and everyone is aware of—and expects—such 
sanctioning to occur (Axelrod 1984). In this way, the foreknowledge and 
valuation of future interactions makes actors more likely to cooperate 
in the present. Cooperation becomes the rational strategy even when it 
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(COREPER), for instance, has fueled a socialization 
process. As a result, actors were better able to under-
stand each other’s problems and operating constraints, 
thereby facilitating a problem-solving approach in 
cases where hardcore intergovernmental bargaining 
might otherwise be expected (Lewis 1998, 2003; cf. 
Hooghe 2005). Recent research on civil protection co-
operation in the EU empirically confirms the import-
ance of mutual trust (Widmalm, Parker, and Persson 
2019; cf. Ekengren 2018). A study of the EU’s military 
crisis management operations talks about a culture of 
compromise that has emerged between states as a re-
sult of intensive collaboration over the years (Novaky 
2015).
All this leads us to formulate the following 
hypothesis:
H4:  The greater actors’ shared experience (par-
ticularly with building and deploying crisis 
management capacities), the greater the 
chance of a collaborative response.
Implementing a Joint Crisis Response
So far we he have examined several factors that are 
thought to nurture a willingness to engage in a multi-
lateral crisis response. Now, we return to Olson’s core 
assertion: even when sufficient common ground for co-
operation exists, actors often fail to follow through and 
work together (the so-called defection problem). The 
collective action literature identifies three factors that 
seem to have an impact on joint action: the number 
of actors involved, the availability of a coordination 
mechanism and the existence of feasible solutions. The 
crisis literature identifies another important factor: 
leadership. We will consider these factors in the con-
text of transboundary crises and formulate a second 
set of hypotheses.
Number of Actors
Olson’s best-known finding is that the “free-riding” 
problem increases—and the prospects for successful 
collective action concurrently decrease—with group 
size. This notion that the prospects for collective ac-
tion diminish with a growing number of actors 
involved has become accepted wisdom in the inter-
national cooperation literature (Keohane and Ostrom 
1994; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 765; Oye 
1985; Sandler 1998, 243; Sandler 2004, 32–4; Scharpf 
2006).19
The primary logical support for this claim is that 
as the number of actors in a group increases, the 
incentives for rational individuals to contribute de-
crease (due to the nature of the relationship between 
the costs and benefits of contributing (Olson 1965).20 
Olson also noted that it is simply more difficult and 
costly to coordinate actor behavior in large groups (cf. 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1970; Hardin 1982, 43; 
Sandler 2004, 33).
The crisis literature adds empirical insights that 
confirm this notion. Countries tend to have very 
distinct crisis management structures and cul-
tures, which can differ along a multitude of di-
mensions (Kuipers et  al. 2015). The accompanying 
variety of approaches and practices creates quite a 
puzzle for transboundary crisis coordination (Boin 
and Bynander 2015; Laegreid and Rykkja 2018; 
Widmalm, Parker, and Persson 2019). The resulting 
challenges diminish the prospect of transboundary 
collaboration.
So, while it is admittedly not a groundbreaking hy-
pothesis, we do nevertheless expect that
H5:  The larger the affected group of nations, the less 
likely is a collaborative response to emerge.21
Coordination Mechanisms
Olson (1965, 2, emphasis added) famously warned 
that “unless the number of individuals in a group is 
quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other 
special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act 
to achieve their common or group interests.” The col-
lective action literature prescribes binding rules and 
a collective enforcement mechanism to mitigate the 
free-rider problem and thereby facilitate cooperation 
(Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1970).
National governments use this “coercive authority” 
function within their countries. They compel the pro-
vision of public goods such as national defense or a 
public education system through their power to raise 
and spend revenue. But such authority is, of course, 
rare at the international level (Nordhaus 2006; Oye 
1985; Russett and Sullivan 1971), particularly when 
19 For support in the crisis literature, see Ansell, Boin, and Keller (2010) 
and Quarantelli (1988).
20 Subsequent research has shown that this incentives-based effect is 
actually more nuanced than Olson contended. It is now widely regarded 
as context- or case-dependent, meaning that in some collective active 
situations the incentives structure can favor collaboration, whereas in 
others it confounds collaboration (Hardin 1982, Chapter 3; Keohane and 
Ostrom 1994; Oliver 1993, 274–5; Sandler 1992, 35–54; Sandler 2004, 11, 
32–4; Udéhn 1993, 241–2).
21 This hypothesis assumes similar levels of crisis exposure: the 
expectation is that 180 countries evenly exposed to a crisis will find 
it more difficult to develop and implement a collaborative response 
than 20 countries evenly exposed to a crisis. Conversely, 180 mutually 
vulnerable countries might be more likely to cooperate than 20 unevenly 
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it comes to crisis management (cf. Boin, Busuioc, and 
Groenleer 2014).22 Its absence makes actual collabor-
ation elusive, according to the collective action litera-
ture (Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 
2001, 766; Oye 1985, 20; cf. Kaul and Blondin 2016; 
Ocampo and Stiglitz 2011).
The crisis management literature offers a crucial in-
sight with regard to the effectiveness of various types 
of facilitating mechanisms (often discussed in terms of 
coordination mechanisms). Crisis scholars distinguish 
between a hierarchized, top-down approach and mechan-
isms that are designed to facilitate emergent collaboration. 
There appears to be general agreement that a so-called 
command-and-control approach does not work, espe-
cially in a network setting where there is no actor in a 
position to command others (Boin and Bynander 2015). 
Collaboration is more likely, say crisis management 
scholars, when emergent collaboration—willing actors 
seeking to act together—is facilitated rather than directed 
(for an instructive example, see Beck and Plowman 2014).
Crisis research shows that international organiza-
tions can facilitate and enable emergent collaboration.23 
At the global level, we might think of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and its efforts to support multi-
country responses to disease outbreaks. For instance, 
the WHO took on this task in response to the recent 
Ebola outbreak, working—not without criticism—to 
coordinate the large-scale multilateral and multi-level 
response. The EU has a number of effective mechanisms 
(Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013).24 For instance, 
the EU has built a substantial institutional machinery 
(policies, funding, organizational capacity) to coordinate 
relief efforts of member states in the face of large-scale 
crises.25 The EU now routinely initiates and runs quite 
complicated response efforts when a state requests as-
sistance (Widmalm, Parker, and Persson 2019).
Building on these insights, we arrive at the following 
hypothesis:
H6:  The availability of organizational capacity 
to facilitate emergent coordination across 
boundaries makes transboundary crisis 
management collaboration more likely.
Feasible Solutions
Common intuition suggests that the nature of a problem 
can make collaboration harder or easier to achieve. 
Crisis scholars have done a lot of work—not all of it 
fruitful—on building crisis classifications and exploring 
how these may affect the response to the various crisis 
types. The key defining factor, crisis scholars seem to 
agree, is the level of uncertainty with regard to causes 
and solution (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010, 197–8; Boin 
et al. 2016, 3–4; Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001, 7; 
Sagan 1994, 234; Weick and Sutcliffe 2015). A readily 
identifiable threat, with known causes and proven solu-
tions, helps multiple actors to mobilize a crisis response 
by providing a convergence point for collaboration.
We can find agreement in the collective action litera-
ture. For Sandler (1998, 237), the resolution of uncer-
tainty about the origins of an international problem is 
“a precondition for collective action.” As an example, 
he cites the Montreal Protocol (widely regarded as 
one of the more successful instances of international 
cooperation in response to a crisis) and argues that it 
would not have emerged in the absence of a direct link 
between chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and depletion 
of the Earth’s ozone layer.26 An example of a recent 
22 The development of such capacities is itself a second-order collective 
action problem, hence their international rarity. As Oye (1985, 21) points 
out, the creation of collective enforcement mechanisms “demand[s] 
an extraordinary degree of cooperation.” But where binding rules and 
enforcement authority do exist, the theoretical expectation is that they will 
facilitate cooperation. Some binding agreements backed by enforcement 
authority do exist at the global level, with the World Trade Organization’s 
dispute settlement system and NATO’s Article 5 as well-known examples. 
Even in the EU, there are few binding agreements with regard to a joint 
crisis response. In the EU, there are some reporting requirements and 
binding response protocols (for instance, in the event of an animal disease 
outbreak or food-chain threat). Plus, the EU has developed real capacity 
to trigger joint responses to financial crises. But most responses to most 
types of crises fully depend on the willingness of states to join forces.
23 This finding is supported by Ostrom’s research (Ostrom 1990; see 
also Agrawal 2002; Cox, Arnold, and Villamayor Tomás 2010). Sabel 
and Victor (2017) have questioned how bottom-up approaches to 
coordination can get off the bottom when it comes to international—
as opposed to community-level—collaboration, and they accordingly 
suggest a central, institutionalized body, but one designed to link-up the 
efforts of actors rather than to direct them top-down.
24 For an overview, see Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard (2013); Backman and 
Rhinard (2018). This is not to say that the EU is endowed with full-fledged 
crisis management capacities. Areas, such as civil protection, critical 
infrastructure, energy security, health security, and the fight against terrorism 
continue to be regarded primarily as national responsibilities. We might say 
that European security cooperation today is in the same place that economic 
cooperation was in the early 1980s (cf. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016).
25 The EU now has the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), 
a 24/7 crisis center operated by the Commission’s Directorate-General 
for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), and 
the Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR). The EU 
also has in place an array of sense-making systems and crisis rooms 
(Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2014). The EU Member States have 
recourse to the Solidarity Clause, which confers upon any Member 
State overwhelmed by a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster 
the right to request assistance from the other Member States, as well 
as the Union itself (Martino 2015; Myrdal and Rhinard 2010). In addition, 
various EU agencies have demonstrated capacity to support joint crisis 
management operations (Pérez Duran and Triviño Salazar 2018).
26 There are studies of international cooperation which suggest that uncertainty 
about the nature of a collective problem can actually drive collaboration (see, 
e.g., Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Sabel and Victor 2017). Generally, however, 
the mechanism these studies imply—a mutual learning or problem-solving 
process that unfolds over time—does not appear to be a fast-acting one. 
That is, its practical relevance in crisis situations characterized by extreme 
levels of urgency can be questioned. For its part, the crisis literature has long 
been unequivocal about the impact of uncertainty on crisis responses: it 
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transboundary crisis in which there was prolonged un-
certainty about the nature of the threat is the so-called 
Cucumber Crisis of 2011. This deadly Escherichia coli 
outbreak was centered in Germany but cases spread to 
several European countries. German officials notably 
framed the outbreak as the fault of Spanish cucumber 
producers before its real source—an organic farm lo-
cated in Germany—was finally identified. As a result, 
cooperation between the various states involved was 
undermined, to say the least.
Even if the proximate cause(s) of a crisis are identi-
fied, transnational response efforts may be confounded 
by the lack of available response options or uncer-
tainty about their effects (Fearon 1998; Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Different options tend to 
have divergent cost-benefit implications for the states 
involved and therefore may present bargaining prob-
lems (Garrett 1992, 534, 541; Koremenos, Lipson, 
and Snidal 2001, 765; Krasner 1991; Morrow 1994; 
Singleton and Taylor 1992, 319). Quarantelli and 
Dynes (1976, 142), doyens of disaster studies, noted 
that multiple response options can engender “commu-
nity polarization around [the] different possibilities.” 
The Icelandic Ash crisis in 2010 illustrates the point: 
the causes of air traffic paralysis were undisputed (the 
ash cloud from the Eyjafjallajökull volcano), but there 
was uncertainty about the level of ash density through 
which it was safe to fly and policymakers initially 
struggled to agree on a workable solution (Kuipers and 
Boin 2015).
The literature suggests that this problem can be miti-
gated—and international collaboration facilitated—by 
the availability of a salient, seemingly effective solution. 
In 1960, Schelling developed the concept of “focal points” 
(alternatively termed “Schelling points,” prominent solu-
tions, and salient solutions). The underlying logic here is 
that if a form of cooperation “can be identified as in some 
way obvious and perhaps fair, [group] members may re-
spect it” (Russett and Sullivan 1971, 858; Young 1989, 
363; Young and Osherenko 1993, 14; Zürn 1992, as 
cited in Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997, 53–8). 
The mechanism is straightforward: by offering a clear 
focal point around which expectations and preferences 
can converge, prominent solutions “can be decisive in 
the resolution of distributional conflict in [international] 
bargaining” (Fearon 1998, 298).27
Solutions for complex policy problems may emerge 
from different sources, including international law 
(Russett and Sullivan 1971, 858); repeated negoti-
ations within a regime (Fearon 1998, 298); epistemic 
communities (Ekengren 2018; Haas 1992); or idea-
tional focal points (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Garrett and Weingast 1993). It is not clear, however, 
whether these sources provide timely solutions in times 
of crisis.
One might expect to find such solutions in crisis 
plans. It turns out that such plans rarely contain ef-
fective solutions for transboundary crises. Clarke 
(1999) famously described disaster and crisis plans as 
“fantasy documents” because the proposed approaches 
simply cannot work. Creating solutions “on the fly” 
may be the next best thing. For some crisis types, es-
pecially the “known” crises, schools of thought exist 
that provide a basis for developing solutions (think 
of financial crises or epidemics). For other crisis types 
(the “unknown unknowns”), a solution may have to 
be invented pretty much in the moment. We thus see 
a continuum that ranges from the availability of a 
prominent and feasible solution to a wide-open policy 
space in which solutions must somehow be found (and 
quickly). We hypothesize that the former scenario is 
more likely to result in a cooperative response than the 
latter.
This discussion of uncertainty leads to the following 
hypothesis:
H7:  When causes are clear and a proven solution 
is available (or a clear route to finding one), 
collaborative crisis management becomes 
more likely.
Leadership
Once states agree in principle that cooperation is de-
sirable if not necessary, a final push may be needed 
to bridge the gap between intention and action. In 
the public administration literature, the presence 
of so-called “czars” has been described as critical to 
cross-policy coordination successes (for a discussion, 
see Vaughn 2014). The literature on crisis management 
often refers to the role of leadership to drive crisis 
collaboration (Boin et al. 2016). Empirical studies of 
transboundary crisis management successes appear 
to confirm to notion [Vasi and Macy (2003) refer to 
“mobilizers”]. For instance, the leadership of Javier 
Solana—in his capacity of EU High Representative—
has been described as indispensable when it came to 
implementing the earliest EU military crisis manage-
ment missions (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013; 
Nováky 2015).
Leadership is, of course, hard to define and its ef-
fects are hard to establish. Moreover, one might ques-
tion how much room there is for these “mobilizers” in 
the face of crisis. Yet, the crisis literature sees a distinct 
role for crisis leaders. While we assume that the room 
for crisis entrepreneurs such as Solana may be limited 
27 Smart and Vertinsky (1977) argue that the need to urgently evaluate a 
wide range of potential responses in the midst of a crisis can overload 
and paralyze organizations. For an intriguing approach to make that 
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in the international arena, we can hypothesize that 
such officials may make a difference:
H8:  The presence of a trusted and experienced 
leader facilitates the implementation of 
transboundary crisis collaboration.
Studying Collective Action in the Face of 
Transboundary Crises: Toward a Theoretical 
Framework
We started this article with the following re-
search question: How can the (non-)emergence of 
transboundary crisis management collaboration be 
explained? To answer this question, we reviewed the 
collective action and crisis management literatures. 
The key observation in the collective action literature 
holds that countries are unlikely to collaborate un-
less it is in their interest or they are coaxed to collab-
orate. The crisis literature asserts that the presence of 
a transboundary crisis, by itself, does not necessarily 
make transboundary collaboration more likely. The 
default expectation, according to these theoretical 
insights, should therefore be that collaboration be-
tween states is unlikely to materialize in the face of a 
transboundary crisis.
That does not mean it is impossible. It simply sug-
gests that major barriers must be overcome before 
states will deliver a joint response to a transboundary 
crisis.28 Based on our reading of that literature, we rec-
ognize three barriers that must be negotiated:
Barrier #1: States must accept the necessity 
of international collaboration in the face of a 
transboundary crisis.
Barrier #2: States must agree to collaborate.
Barrier #3: States must jointly implement the 
agreed-upon strategy.
Both literatures identify a set of conditions and factors 
that are thought to enhance or decrease the prospects of 
joint collaboration in the face of crisis. More specific-
ally, the literature identifies factors that can help to push 
states over the barriers to a joint response. Conditions 
of interdependence, even exposure, low politicization 
and mutual trust are thought to help states overcome 
the first two barriers. The third barrier to actual collab-
oration is more likely to be bridged when the group of 
affected states is relatively small, coordination mechan-
isms are present, feasible solutions are available and rec-
ognized leadership is involved in bringing and keeping 
the states together. In figure  1, we have depicted our 
understanding of the barriers between key steps in the 
process that leads to transboundary crisis collaboration 
and the factors operating on these barriers.
This article has offered a set of hypotheses that to-
gether may help to explain under which conditions 
a group of states will work together in the face of a 
transboundary crisis. The next critical step is to op-
erationalize key variables and test the hypotheses. 
Moreover, it will be necessary to establish whether these 
variables are critical conditions or enabling factors. 
This will require a fresh empirical effort, as neither the 
crisis literature nor the collective action literature has 
systematically studied transboundary crisis responses. 
The task is to build a database of transboundary crises 
that allows for coding both the dependent variable 
(collective action) and the independent variables iden-
tified in this article (cf. Blondin forthcoming).
A Sense of Optimism?
If there is one thing that all collective action and 
crisis scholars appear to agree on, it is that the nation 
state cannot handle a transboundary crisis by itself. 
A  joint response is often needed. The work of these 
scholars may predict failure, but we know that, at least 
in some cases, states do work together to manage a 
transboundary crisis.
The EU is a case in point: joint collaboration has 
been built and it is used. At the same time, these capaci-




















Figure 1. A process model of transboundary crisis collaboration.
28 This use of barriers is inspired by the so-called barrier model in the 
policy literature describing the hurdles that problems or issues must 
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a long way in explaining why the EU manages to jointly 
respond to one crisis (the Icelandic Ash crisis), while 
utterly failing in the face of other crises (immigration). 
This allows for a sense of optimism: there may be a road 
forward that leads to regimes in policy sectors affected 
by transboundary crises that will facilitate or perhaps 
even encourage collaborative crisis responses. Our re-
view of the literature suggests a pathway toward a joint 
crisis response: transboundary crisis collaboration is 
more likely to emerge when it is facilitated by some type 
of international institution with proven capacities.
Building on our theoretical discussion, we can start 
thinking about the institutional features and types of 
capacities that are most likely to make a difference 
(cf. Lodge and Wegrich 2014). First of all, it would 
be helpful to create analytical capacity that helps to 
produce accurate, informative, and authoritative situ-
ation reports so that different actors can agree on the 
cause, scope, urgency, and potential effects of the threat. 
In the international arena, this type of capacity exists 
but is scattered across institutions and policy sectors 
(Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2014). Second, it may 
help to have formal agreements in place with regard to 
the need of joint action should a transboundary crisis 
materialize. NATO’s Article 5 and the EU’s Solidarity 
Clause offer promising templates. Third, it helps to 
have coordination templates in place that facilitate col-
laboration in dynamic times.
In a time when transboundary crises appear to be 
on the rise, a sense of optimism might be derived from 
this article. It is possible—even collective action theor-
ists agree—to build the institutional capacities needed 
to forge a joint crisis response. The question remains 
when and how countries choose to make use of these 
capacities.
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